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Introduction to the Issue
This is the second issue of Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal. Seven 
articles — out of the nine presented here to the Reader — undertake our 
leading theme: Tracing Liminal and Boundary Experience in Philosophical 
and Religious Discourse. Three articles from that group (written by 
Małgorzata Bogaczyk-Vormayr, Piotr Augustyniak and Anna Szyrwińska) 
explore various aspects of the boundary experience in a historical per-
spective. The next four pick up the same theme in a contemporary per-
spective: the articles of Joachim Piecuch, Tadeusz Gadacz and Antoni 
Szwed discuss the philosophy of Józef Tischner, the article by Urszula 
Idziak presents the debate between Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricoeur con-
cerning the boundary experience of death. The remaining two articles 
published here are not connected with the leading theme — Magdalena 
Nowak presents a history of the concept of Einfühlung and Jacquette Dale 
tries to improve the diagram method used in logical argument analysis.
The article of Małgorzata Bogaczyk-Vormayr Veränderung zur Praktike. 
Kleine Bemerkungen zur Lebensphilosophie des Evagrios Pontikos analyses the 
boundary experience of crisis (depression, dissipation, fatigue) which is 
not necessarily a sign of final defeat, but — according to ancient philos-
ophers and the early Christian Desert Fathers — can be a turning point 
for finding oneself and discovering new possibilities of action. The Greek 
philosophers and Christian thinkers are here in agreement — the art of 
life should consist in the capability of accepting the variability of human 
condition and keeping the balance both in front of luck and lack of luck. 
This is precisely the aim of a philosophy designed as a practical exercise 
in the art of dying — it taught not only that life does not last and has its 
own limits, but also that the experience of these limits can be the source 
of power and the opportunity of finding inner peace.
The article by Piotr Augustyniak Meister Eckhart’s God confronted with 
the Nietzschean critique of christianity also picks up the problem of the 
boundary experience of life and death but in the medieval context and 
in a different perspective. Meister Eckhart tried to eliminate certain draw-
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backs which appeared in a Christianity connected on the one hand with 
the common experience of projecting spatial visions on transcendent 
otherworldliness and, on the other hand, with the pragmatic, trading ra-
tionality of everyday life, which sees salvation as the prize obtained in 
the other world for a good life in this world. Friedrich Nietzsche and Mar-
tin Heidegger see here the essence of Christianity as “the Platonism for 
the masses” but Meister Eckhart’s Christian vision of God and salvation 
is completely different. Anticipating to a great extent Nietzsche’s cri-
tique, Eckhart tries to show that the widely spread medieval metaphysi-
cal and anthropological assumptions of Christianity as a concern for 
one’s own happiness in the other world are wrong. Eckhart maintains 
that a genuine Christian must understand that his salvation is being re-
alized here and now, and that he must undergo the experience of com-
pletely giving up the concern for his own happiness. In this process he 
questions himself radically and becomes ready to accept death. Only 
such a complete resignation can carry within itself the boundary experi-
ence of Gelassenheit, a liberation and calmness which is the beginning of 
true life.
The article by Anna Szyrwińska Die Grundlagen der Normativitat bei 
Kant und Spener analyses the problem of the transformation of the explic-
itly religious and mystical discourse of the founder of German pietism, 
Philip Spener, into the transcendental philosophy of Kant, which explic-
itly rejects all mystical and supernatural connections. In The conflict of 
the Faculties Kant discusses the Spener problem connected with the the-
ological concept of being born again as a result of conversion, he takes 
over the theme of second birth and of the radical inner change of dispo-
sition (Gesinnung). Spener connects the second birth with the necessity 
of transcending the boundary between the natural and the supernatural, 
but Kant disagrees with it. According to Kant the inner transformation is 
done by submission not to a supernatural and divine law, but to the law 
of reason. In spite of these differences there are important similarities be-
tween these two authors. First of all they both assume that reason is the 
condition of moral actions and capabilities; secondly they both assert the 
existence of tensions between individual inclinations and general moral 
law and, in the third place, they both assume that the will of submission 
to moral law and of following its injunctions is based on the rational rec-
ognition of that law. Using these three elements Kant builds a consistent 
theory of inner moral motivation the general outline of which is already 
present in Spener’s writings. The religious pattern of second birth, which 
indicates the boundary experience of sin, and liberation from sin, under-
goes a change in Kant, but maintains its validity — to follow the gener-
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al moral rule of action one has to break with individual sensual inclina-
tions.
The article by Joachim Piecuch Józef Tischner’s phenomenology of bound-
ary experience shows Tischner’s phenomenology as realizing Husserl’s pos-
tulate (Zurück zu den Sachen selbst) and trying to reach the source experi-
ence, due to which the experience of the surrounding world acquires mean-
ingful sense. The author shows that consistent phenomenological thinking 
leads to the conclusion that the idea of source experience is identical with 
the idea of boundary experience. The ways of apprehending boundary ex-
periences depend to a great extent on metaphysical assumptions, which 
constitute various paradigmatic phenomenologies. There are four phenom-
enologies like this in Tischner’s philosophy depending on the different 
concepts of source experience: 1) the transcendental “I”, 2) the axiological 
“I”, 3) the historical Dasein, 4) the meeting. The paradigm of meeting — 
the relation with the Other — deserves particular attention. It is precisely 
in this relationship that Tischner saw a form of boundary experience which 
also sets the boundaries of phenomenology itself. Here Tischner follows 
Lévinas — the face of the Other is not an ordinary object phenomenon, it 
does not appear in the same way as any other object, but reveals itself as 
its own expression. According to Tischner being is endowed with meaning-
ful sense because of the phenomena of liberty and goodness, but these phe-
nomena must be analyzed within the perspective of the boundary experi-
ence of meeting.
The article of Tadeusz Gadacz Das Problem des Bösen in der Philosophie 
Józef Tischners presents Tischner’s phenomenology of evil. According to 
Tischner evil is not one of the many phenomena that surround us be-
cause it is not a phenomenon at all but an appearance situated outside 
being and sense. In Tischner’s language the “agathological” experience 
of evil is an experience of what should not be. In this sense this experi-
ence shows the problematical character of existence — by revealing the 
negative side of the surrounding world it also marks the limits of human-
kind. To be human we must justify our own existence. The “agathologi-
cal” experience is always a sort of rebellion experience, which starts the 
serious thinking responsible for the Other, before whom man tries to jus-
tify himself. This is why for Tishner the face of the Other is a gift of the 
“agathological” horizon, a gift which provides ethical bearings. Agathol-
ogy does not cancel or replace axiology. It marks not only the limits of 
humankind but it is also a rebellion against evil, a call to action ruled by 
an axiological order. As a dramatic boundary experience of what should 
not be agathology not only leads to axiological thinking according to 
values but it can also reveal the structural evil inherent in values. 
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The whole system of acquired values may reveal itself as something that 
should not be. In this sense agathology performs a controlling function 
of axiology.
The article by Antoni Szwed The Reception of Søren Kierkegaard’s 
Thought in Józef Tischner’s Philosophy concentrates on a few key experi-
ences of both philosophers: the experience of beauty, despair and soli-
tude. The first part gives us a knowledgeable and finely nuanced recon-
struction of Kierkegaard’s philosophy and of Tischner’s ways of reading 
Kierkegaard’s texts. Tishner’s interpretations reveal hidden tragic dilem-
mas, especially the threat of madness lurking in the experience of lone-
liness. In Tishner’s thought the experience of loneliness together with 
the experience of despair becomes an autonomous subject of analysis. 
Tishner’s analysis is different from that of Kierkegaard because he inter-
prets these experiences within the perspective of what he calls Polish 
melancholy.
The article by Urszula Idziak Ricoeur and Derrida — the Heritage of 
Death presents the debate between Ricouer and Derrida concerning two 
different ways of understanding the boundary experience of death, called 
“survival” by Derrida and “life until death” by Ricoeur. Both authors 
agree that learning to live means learning to die. For Ricoeur, however, 
learning to die means learning to give up oneself and learning to trans-
fer one’s own love of life onto someone close to us. This act of transfer 
shows the fidelity of the dying person towards those fundamentals 
which transcend human finitude. Derrida analyzes the problem of learn-
ing to die from a completely different perspective. For him each dying 
person becomes close to us. We have not learnt to live and to die because 
in life and death we are visited by spectres — here Derrida recalls the 
ghost of the father who visited Hamlet, Kierkegaard and Kafka. These 
spectres not only prevent us to learn to live and to die, but also show 
a paradox peculiar for each individual, one impossible to be repeated, ex-
pressed or transferred to someone else. Standing on the side of Hamlet, 
Kierkegaard and Kafka, Derrida claims that deconstruction teaches a fi-
delity towards our spectres. It is a fidelity not towards ourselves (one’s 
own life and death) but towards the difference, towards everything im-
possible to be expressed and it is at the same time precisely this differ-
ence which constitutes our individuality. 
Two following articles are not connected with the leading theme of 
this issue. Magdalena Nowak in her The complicated History of “Einfüh-
lung” presents not only a history of the concept of Einfuhlung but also its 
contemporary renaissance in human sciences in particular its uses in the 
Dominic Lacapra projects of historical research. Whereas Dale Jacquette 
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in Enhancing the Diagramming Method in Informal Logic argues for appli-
cation of the diagramming method of testing logical coherence to such 
cases as vicious circle, contradictions or reductio ad absurdum, as useful 
pedagogically in teaching basic logic a critical reasoning skills at all lev-
els of scientific education.
This issue contains also Ivo Frenzel and Willy Hochkeppel’s talk with 
Herbert Marcuse translated by Jacek Zelek, and five reviews by Seweryn 
Blandzi, Maciej Urbanek, Tomasz Borycki, Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz and 
Kinga Elert.
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